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Media Coverage and Firm Valuation: Evidence from China 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on both a managerial-discipline perspective and an information-intermediary 
perspective, we explore how media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder influences 
firm valuation in corporate China. Using 366 listed family firms in China from 2003–2006, 
we find that firms in which controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports enjoy 
higher valuation, whereas negative media reports on controlling shareholders impose adverse 
effects on firm valuation. Interestingly, favorable media coverage of the controlling 
shareholders does not enhance firm value. Further analyses reveal that ownership structure 
and audit quality moderate the relationship between media coverage and firm valuation. Our 
study complements the emerging literature on the monitoring role of the media on the stock 
markets. 
 
Keywords: media coverage; valuation; family firms; China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
I. Introduction 
The Chinese media has been highly controlled by the government since the founding 
of the People’s Republic in 1949. The Chinese government, with its dominant ideology and 
propaganda, does not allow non-state capital to invest, establish, or operate any media, thus 
limiting the independence and freedom of the media. China’s rank on the Press Freedom 
Index, compiled and published by Reporters Without Borders, was 171 out of 178 countries 
in 2010. It is commonly believed that the Chinese media is more likely to report good rather 
than bad news. 
However, due to the lack of sufficient funds to support daily operations, China’s 
media are forced to introduce Western-style media management systems to enhance 
efficiency and performance, and to produce high-quality reporting to attract an audience. In 
recent years, we have seen the media increasingly acting in a whistle-blower role on the 
Chinese capital market. In 2001, a Chinese financial magazine, Caijing, published an article 
alleging the misrepresentation of export activities by a listed company, Yingguangxia. The 
report triggered an investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
which revealed a profit overstatement of RMB745 million from 1998 to 2001. Four of the 
company’s top management were arrested and jailed for forging documents and the 
fraudulent misrepresentation of financial information. The fallout from Yingguangxia, which 
had been a recent top performer on the Chinese stock market, revealed the deficiencies of the 
country's internal corporate governance system, while also showing an increase in the 
monitoring role of the Chinese media. 
The literature provides varied results concerning the monitoring role of media 
coverage. The media may act as an external disciplining mechanism that can reverse 
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corporate governance violations (Miller 2006; Tetlock 2007; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 
2008; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 2009; Tetlock 2011; among others) or as an information 
intermediary, collecting and sharing information with a wider audience to reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (Fang and Peress 2009; Bushee et al. 2010; 
among others). In this study, we examine how media coverage of a firm’s controlling 
shareholder influences its market value in corporate China. We argue that controlling 
shareholders with more media coverage will be subject to stricter media scrutiny and 
consequently suffer a higher reputation loss when violating generally accepted governance 
codes. As a result, the firms whose controlling shareholders receive greater media coverage 
will be less likely to engage in misconduct and hence enjoy higher valuation. The media may 
also collect and share more information with investors to reduce information asymmetry. 
Hence the firms whose controlling shareholders receive greater media coverage will have a 
lower cost of capital and higher valuation. 
Using all Chinese family firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the 2003–2006 period, we find that firms whose controlling 
shareholders receive more neutral media coverage are valued higher by investors, after 
controlling for various factors, including the potential endogeneity issue. We also find that 
unfavorable media coverage of controlling shareholders imposes an adverse effect on firm 
valuation. Interestingly, we do not document that favorable media coverage regarding 
controlling shareholders leads to higher firm value. This may be because investors cast doubt 
on the integrity of journalists who portray a controlling shareholder too favorably (Li 2012). 
Further analyses reveal that ownership structure and audit quality moderate the relationship 
between media coverage and firm valuation. 
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Our study complements the existing literature in two ways. First, our study 
contributes to a growing literature exploring the connection between the media and the stock 
market. Prior studies have examined the role of the media in mitigating the agency conflict 
between management and shareholders (i.e., the Type I agency problem) (Miller 2006; 
Bushee et al., 2010). However, many public firms around the world are better characterized 
by a concentrated ownership structure, which suffer primarily from the Type II agency 
problem (a conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders). By investigating how 
media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholders influences firm value we expand and 
complement the literature on the monitoring role of the media in the stock markets. In this 
regard, China provides an appropriate setting in which to test our hypotheses. The controlling 
shareholders in Chinese listed firms hold, on average, 32% of the total outstanding shares, 
while the average ownership by the second largest shareholder is merely 12%. This results in 
a high risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder (Aharony 
et al. 2010, Jiang et al. 2010, among others), and the characteristics and activities of 
controlling shareholders impose significant influences on firms’ value in China. 
Second, this study also contributes to our understanding of media governance. 
Djankov et al. (2003) suggest that government ownership of the media will undermine the 
monitoring role of the media. The authors find that government ownership of the media is 
negatively associated with political and economic freedom, including a less free press, fewer 
political rights for citizens, and increased corruption. Nevertheless, our study suggests that 
the media can still play an active role in mitigating agency conflicts in corporate China, 
although it may appear counterintuitive to highlight the salient characteristics of China’s 
state-owned and non-free media. It is also reported that Chinese journalists engage in 
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misbehavior and malpractices such as individual red-envelope taking and institutional rent 
seeking (Li 2012). However, in practice, “the Chinese media enjoy significantly more 
autonomy in reporting on financial misconduct than they do reporting on most other areas of 
Chinese law and society. The media are perhaps the most effective regulator of corporate 
wrongdoing in China today (Liebman and Milhaupt 2008, p. 980).” Fierce competition 
among the media companies also motivates them to produce high quality news to attract 
readers and advertising agents. This suggests that marketization reform can provide desired 
incentives even though the media remains under tight control by the government.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature 
review and develops the hypotheses. Section III outlines the research design, and Section IV 
provides the sample collection procedures and descriptive statistics of the main variables. In 
Section V we present the empirical results. The summary and conclusions are presented in 
Section VI. 
 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The literature has offered several explanations on the role of media coverage in 
corporate governance. These explanations are based on nonexclusive views of the media as a 
managerial discipline mechanism or as an information intermediary mechanism. 
 
A. Media Coverage as a Managerial Discipline Mechanism 
The existing literature argues that media coverage can shape the reputation of market 
participants and thus pressure them to behave in ways that are socially acceptable. Fombrun 
and Shanley (1990) interpret reputation as the outcome of a competitive process in which 
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market participants indicate their key characteristics to maximize their social status. Dyck, 
Volchkova, and Zingales (2008) were probably the first to comprehensively study the role of 
the media in corporate governance. They argue that a director or manager will be dissuaded 
from reputation-hurting action if, and only if: 
E(Private benefit) < E(Reputational cost) + E(Punishment) 
= α * Reputational Cost + β * Punishment,                                (1) 
where α is the probability that the public will receive the news about the manager’s action 
and will believe it and β is the probability of enforcement. 
The media will influence all four factors on the right-hand side of Eq. (1). It is 
obvious that more media coverage will increase probability α, and that the public will receive 
the news about the manager’s action and will believe it. The media can also affect the 
right-hand side of the equation by increasing the size of reputational cost. Media attention can 
affect not only managers’ reputations with outside shareholders and future employers, but 
also their societal reputation. In the traditional understanding of reputation (see, for example, 
Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), managers’ future wages depend on investors’ and future 
employers’ beliefs about whether the managers will attend to their interests in situations 
where they cannot be monitored. With more awareness among investors and employers by 
spinning the news, the reputational cost in the form of future wage decrement will increase. 
This concern about a future financial penalty can prevent managers from taking advantage of 
opportunities for self-dealing, and present themselves as responsible agents. 
The media can also impact the right-hand side of Eq. (1) by influencing the 
probability of enforcement (β) and the size of punishment. Reputational concerns prevent 
insiders from appropriating corporate assets because they know that if they are caught, share 
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prices will fall, they may be sued or challenged in a proxy fight, and they will lose status 
among their peers. This is not merely a threat to their dignity, but more importantly, they will 
suffer in their service market and be unable to secure other board or management positions. 
Reputation is also important to policymakers, providing an incentive to react to media 
coverage of a corporate governance violation. Therefore, policymakers will be more likely to 
take an action to address a problem and enforce a heavier penalty if the problem is visible to a 
wider community. In this way, the media also indirectly influences corporate governance 
practices by putting pressure on policymakers to adjust the legal or regulatory infrastructure 
of the region in which the violating company operates. The Yingguangxia case we discussed 
in the introduction section provides good anecdotal evidence.  
Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (2008) use a Russian case study to empirically 
demonstrate the role the media plays in corporate governance. They find that in Russia, an 
investment fund’s lobbying increases the coverage of corporate governance violations in the 
Anglo-American media. They also find that this coverage increases the probability that a 
corporate governance violation is subsequently reversed. In summary, existing studies 
support the idea that the media functions as a managerial disciplining mechanism by 
influencing the reputation of managers. Firms with more media coverage will be subject to 
stricter media scrutiny and consequently a higher reputation loss when violating generally 
accepted governance codes (Barton 2005); thus implying that firm insiders with extensive 
media coverage will be less likely to engage in self-dealing activities. This in turn reduces 
agency conflicts between insiders (controlling shareholders and management) and outside 
minority shareholders, and leads to higher firm value (Gompers et al. 2003). 
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Furthermore, media coverage can propagate favorable firm evaluations because the 
firm or insider with greater media coverage occupy more central positions in a social 
network, which in turn enhances a firm’s legitimacy and acceptance and improves its market 
value accordingly (Pollock and Rindova 2003; Bansal and Clelland 2004). 
 
B. Media Coverage as an Information Intermediary Mechanism 
Media coverage also helps to increase a firm’s market value by reducing information 
asymmetry and the related cost of capital. The market value of a firm’s equity equals its 
expected future cash flows discounted at the expected cost of capital (Gordon and Shapiro 
1956). Cost of capital is positively associated with information asymmetry (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991). In certain contexts, media coverage may be viewed as a critical source of 
information disclosure about a firm, which reduces a possible advantage that insiders may 
have over outside investors and helps to reduce information asymmetry. Dyck and Zingales 
(2002) and Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (2008) argue that the media is one vehicle 
through which information is aggregated and credibly communicated to the public (and 
across firms). Thus, the media can help to substantially reduce the costs associated with 
contract parties to collect and evaluate information. National newspapers circulate not only 
within the business community but also throughout the whole population and, as such, can 
provide warning signals to diverse shareholders who may not otherwise have knowledge of 
company activities (Tetlock, 2007). Merton (1987), Deephouse (2000), Baker et al. (2002), 
and Fang and Peress (2009) suggest that media coverage increases the number of investors 
aware of a firm and decreases investor uncertainty about a firm’s characteristics. This in turn 
increases the firm’s stock liquidity, and consequently investors require a lower return for 
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those stocks. In summary, existing studies support the role of the media as an information 
intermediary by reducing information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and outside 
investors. Lower information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by attracting 
more investors due to increased liquidity of its securities (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). 
Thus, we expect that media coverage can lead to a lower cost of capital (and higher firm 
valuation) by reducing information asymmetry on capital markets. 
 
C. The Impact of Media Coverage Content on Firm Valuation 
The impact of media coverage on a firm’s value may be influenced by the content of 
media reports. Although non-negative media reports may increase a firm’s value by 
disciplining insider misconduct and enhancing legitimacy and reputation, unfavorable media 
reports would signal negative signs about a firm’s future performance, thereby reducing 
reputation and legitimacy (Pollock and Rindova 2003). Gurun and Butler (2012), Tetlock 
(2007), and Tetlock et al. (2008) provide empirical support for this argument. They find that a 
firm’s value is lower when it receives negative media reports. Negative news can also impose 
a reputation penalty that reduces a firm’s profitability. For instance, customers may be 
reluctant to purchase from firms with negative news, and investors would require higher 
returns on those stocks to compensate for the higher risks associated with a damaged 
reputation. 
Controlling shareholders exert substantial influence over a firm’s decision within the 
context of a concentrated ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Cronqvist and 
Nilsson 2003). For instance, in September 2006, the imprisonment of Mr. Liangyu Chen, a 
former senior leader of the Chinese Communist Party, resulted in a significant stock price 
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slump for a few Chinese listed firms whose controlling shareholders had explicit or implicit 
connections with Mr. Chen. Investors believe that the change in the political connection of 
those controlling shareholders would significantly affect their firms’ value. Hence we 
primarily investigate how the media coverage of controlling shareholders influences their 
firms’ value. The above discussions suggest that non-negative media reports can increase a 
firm’s value by both preventing insider misconduct and reducing information asymmetry, 
while negative media reports would damage a firm’s reputation, increase investor perceptions 
of the firm’s risk, and consequently reduce the firm’s value. Thus, we have the following 
hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Valuation of firms is higher if their controlling shareholders receive more 
non-negative media reports than firms with controlling shareholders receiving less 
non-negative media reports. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Valuation of firms is lower if their controlling shareholders receive more 
negative media reports than firms with controlling shareholders receiving less negative media 
reports. 
 
III. Research Design 
In this section, we describe the research methodology that is designed to test the 
hypotheses. We employ the following model to examine how media coverage of controlling 
shareholders affects a firm’s valuation: 
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TobinQi ,t+1 =  0 + 1 *NonnegativeMediait + 2 *NegativeMediait + 3 *Controlit
+ 4 *Sizeit + 5 *BMit + 6 *Levit + 7 *ROAit +YearDummies+ IndustryDummies+ 
(2) 
In model (2), the dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q of a firm. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
sum of the market value of stockholders’ equity and the book value of liabilities, divided by 
the sum of the book value of equity and liabilities in year t+1 for firm i. Our first independent 
variable is the non-negative media coverage (NonnegativeMedia) of a firm’s controlling 
shareholder, which is measured as the logarithm of the number of non-negative media reports 
covering the firm’s controlling shareholder in year t for firm i. The second independent 
variable is the negative media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder (NegativeMedia), 
which is measured as the logarithm of the number of negative media reports covering the 
firm’s controlling shareholder in year t for firm i. We expect the estimated coefficient on 
NonnegativeMedia to be positive due to both the monitoring role and the information 
intermediary role played by the media, which prevents controlling shareholder misconduct, 
reduces information asymmetry, and increases firm value. Similarly, we expect the estimated 
coefficient on NegativeMedia to be negative because negative news damages a firm’s 
reputation, increases investor perceptions of a firm’s risk, and consequently reduces its value. 
In order to alleviate the potential endogeneity issue, we regress the next year’s Tobin’s Q on 
the current year’s media coverage. In the robustness tests, we further use the Heckman 
self-selection correction model and the Granger causality test to address the potential 
endogeneity issue. 
We include ownership concentration (Control), firm size (Size), financial leverage 
(Lev), the ratio of book-to-market value of equity (BM), and firm performance (ROA) as 
control variables. The ownership concentration (Control) is the percentage of shares held by 
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the controlling shareholder. Claessens et al. (2002) and Bai et al. (2004) suggest that the 
expropriation risk of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder increases as the 
ownership concentration increases. Hence we expect a negative coefficient on Control. Firm 
size (Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Bai et al. (2004) find that smaller firms 
have higher valuation in China. Thus we expect a negative relationship between firm size and 
Tobin’s Q. Financial leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) suggest that highly leveraged firms generally have lower market value. This 
predicts a negative coefficient on leverage. The ratio of book-to-market value of equity (BM) 
reflects a firm’s growth potential. A higher BM indicates lower growth potential. We 
therefore expect that firm value is negatively associated with BM (Claessens et al. 2002). A 
firm’s market value is typically positively associated with its financial performance, thus we 
also include firms’ return on assets (ROA). Year and industry dummies are included to 
control for year and industry effects. Table 1 provides the definition of our empirical 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
IV. Sample and Data Description 
Our sample comprises all family firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the 2003–2006 period. We focus on family firms for two 
reasons: First, family firms are subject to more severe agency conflict between the controlling 
and minority shareholders (Claessens et al. 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003); Second, the 
controlling shareholders of state-owned firms are typically government agents and Chinese 
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media are reluctant to report negative news involving government agents. Our sample period 
begins with 2003, the year that Chinese listed firms were required to disclose controlling 
shareholder information. We end the sample period in 2006 because of the non-trivial costs 
of hand collecting the media coverage information about the controlling shareholders.  
We hand collect media coverage data from China Infobank (http://www.infobank.cn/), 
an independent data provider that consolidates data from all major Chinese business 
newspapers and magazines. We use the controlling shareholder name as the keyword and 
search the full text of articles in the Infobank database. We exclude the articles that contain 
the same name as the controlling shareholder but refer to a different person. For each article, 
two raters separately read and code its tone and classify the tone of the article as favorable, 
neutral, or unfavorable. When disagreement between these two raters occurs, a third rater 
makes the final coding after discussing it with the other two raters. Similar to Deephouse 
(2000), an article was rated favorable when it praised the controlling shareholder for his/her 
characteristics and/or activities. Examples include an award or outstanding performance by 
the controlling shareholder, and/or charitable donations. An article was rated unfavorable 
when the controlling shareholder was criticized for her/his characteristics and/or activities. 
Examples include tax evasion, business fraud, and other legal or regulatory charges. The 
remaining articles are classified as neutral. Non-negative media coverage is defined as the 
logarithm of (1+ the number of favorable and neutral articles containing the name of a firm’s 
controlling shareholder), negative media coverage is defined as the logarithm of (1+ 
unfavorable articles containing the name of a firm’s controlling shareholder). We also further 
partition non-negative media coverage into positive (favorable) and neutral media coverage 
to examine whether or not investors perceive favorable and neutral reports differently. We 
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obtain financial and ownership-structure information from the China Security Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We exclude firm-year observations with 
insufficient data to compute the required variables, and obtain a sample of 964 observations 
representing 366 unique family firms. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 
99% levels to alleviate the impact of outliers. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of our main variables. The average positive 
articles for a controlling shareholder is about 0.25 articles per year, the mean neutral articles 
1.19, and the mean negative articles 0.43. This suggests that neutral portraits of controlling 
shareholders comprise approximately 64% of media coverage. Furthermore, controlling 
shareholders are more likely to receive unfavorable reports than favorable reports. About 
66% of controlling shareholders had no media exposure during our sample period. 
The mean and median of Tobin’s Q are 1.86 and 1.47, respectively. The median 
(median) ownership concentration is 32% (29%), suggesting that Chinese listed family firms 
are characterized by concentrated ownership structure. The sample firms typically generate a 
low return on assets with a mean (median) of -3% (2%) only. The mean ROA is negative 
because some firms recorded extremely negative ROA during the sample period. On average, 
the leverage ratio of all sample firms is 32%, suggesting that Chinese family firms are under 
leveraged. The mean (median) ratio of book-to-market value of equity is 0.47 (0.48). 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for our main regression 
variables. We find that non-negative media coverage is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q 
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(with an estimated Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.11), while negative media coverage is 
unrelated to Tobin’s Q (with an estimated Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.06), which 
contradict our predictions. As both media coverage and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated with 
other control variables, we need to interpret the correlation matrix results with caution, and it 
is important to control for other firm characteristics when we examine the relationship 
between media coverage and firm value. We will leave this to the multivariate regression test 
in the following section. Although the correlation coefficients between some variables are 
large, the variance inflation factors of all the independent variables are less than 6, indicating 
there is no serious multi-collinearity problem in our regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
V. Empirical Results   
A. Media Coverage and Firm Valuation 
Regression 1 in Table 4 reports the main regression result. As predicted, we find a 
significantly positive association between non-negative media coverage and firm valuation. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on non-negative media coverage (NonnegativeMedia) 
is positive (0.217) and significant at the 1% level, consistent with Hypothesis 1. In addition, 
negative media coverage is negatively associated with firm value (the estimated coefficient is 
-0.336, and significant at the 1% level), suggesting that negative media articles may damage 
firm reputation and increase investor perceptions of firm risk, hence reducing market value. 
This supports Hypothesis 2. 
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We further partition non-negative media reports into two sub-measures: positive 
media coverage and neutral media coverage of controlling shareholders. Regression 2 in 
Table 4 reports the estimation result. We find that the positive association between 
non-negative media coverage and firm value is primarily driven by the neutral reports, while 
the positive media coverage does not affect firm value. As controlling shareholders may bribe 
the media in exchange for favorable reports (Li 2012), investors tend to view the favorite 
media reports as less accurate and therefore less informative, and may even interpret those 
positive reports as collusion between the controlling shareholders and the media (Huang 
2009). Hence, investors are less likely to rely on favorable articles to make investment 
choices. 
The coefficients on control variables are largely consistent with prediction. Firms with 
higher ownership concentration (Control), with higher book-to-market ratio (BM), and with 
more leverage on debt (Lev) are valued lower by investors. The expropriation risk by 
controlling shareholders increases with the degree of ownership concentration (Bai et al. 
2004); therefore firms with higher ownership concentration have lower market value. Larger 
firms (Size) tend to have a lower valuation by investors, which is consistent with the 
diversification discount argument. However, financial performance (ROA) is negatively 
associated with firm value. ROA primarily reflects the current-period performance while 
Tobin’s Q represents the sum of future cash flows. High-growth firms typically have lower 
current-period financial performance but enjoy higher future performance. The average 
revenue growth rate for our sample firms is 25%, indicating that a majority of our sample 
firms grew rapidly during the sample period. This may explain why current-year ROA is 
negatively associated with a firm’s market value. 
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In summary, the results reported in Table 4 are consistent with our hypotheses. Those 
firms whose controlling shareholders receive greater neutral media coverage enjoy a higher 
valuation by investors, and those with more negative media coverage have a lower market 
value. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
B. Robustness Checks 
As firms with higher market values are more likely to receive attention from the 
media, the media coverage variable in our regressions may be endogenous. We perform a 
two-stage Heckman self-selection correction model to address the potential endogeneity issue 
(Heckman 1979). The solution is to include the inverse Mills ratio in the regression models. 
The inverse Mills ratio is computed from the first-stage regression for the likelihood of a 
controlling shareholder receiving greater media exposure:  
Inverse Mills Ratio = ( )
( )
Fit
Fit
I
)
 if a controlling shareholder’s media coverage is greater 
than the median; 
and = ( )-
1- ( )
Fit
Fit
I
)
 if a controlling shareholder’s media coverage is less 
than or equal to the median,  
where Fit is the fitted value computed from the first-stage selection regression, I  represents 
the probability density function of the normal distribution, and )  represents the cumulative 
distribution function of the normal distribution. 
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In the first-stage selection regression we use a Probit model to predict the likelihood 
of a controlling shareholder receiving more media coverage. The dependent variable is 
MediaDummy, which is a dummy variable equal to one if a controlling shareholder’s media 
coverage is greater than the median, and zero otherwise. Miller (2006) suggests that media 
coverage is positively related to firms’ advertising expense. As Chinese listed firms do not 
disclose advertising expense information, we use selling expenses as a proxy for advertising 
expenses. Selling expense primarily includes advertising expenditures, sales salaries, and 
commissions. Zhang et al. (2010) and Ye and Zhang (2011) suggest that selling expense is an 
appropriate proxy for a firm’s advertising intensity in China. We also include ownership 
concentration, firm size, BM, leverage, ROA, industry and year dummies in the first-stage 
selection regression as control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
As reported in Table 5, in the first-stage regression, media coverage is positively 
associated with a firm’s selling expense. We also find that media coverage is positively 
associated with firm size, and negatively associated with BM. The pseudo R-square of the 
first stage regression is 18.8%. 
In the second-stage regression, the inverse Mills ratio is included to control for the 
possible endogeneity issue of media coverage. As reported in the second-stage regression of 
Table 5, Tobin’s Q is still positively related to neutral media coverage, and negatively related 
to negative media coverage. This is qualitatively the same as the results reported in Table 4.  
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We further perform the Granger causality tests in order to address the potential 
reverse causality issue. In Regression 1 (Regression 2) of Table 6 we regress the change in 
neutral media coverage (the change in negative media coverage) during year t+1 on the 
change in Tobin’s Q as well as the change in neutral media coverage (the change in negative 
media coverage) during year t. In Regression 3 of Table 6 we regress the change in Tobin’s Q 
during year t+1 on the changes in neutral and negative media coverage during year t. The 
sample size is substantially reduced because one-year lagged values are required for this test. 
We find that a past change in neutral media coverage positively influences the future change 
in Tobin’s Q (coefficient = 0.164, significant at the 5% level). However, a past change in 
Tobin’s Q does not lead to more neutral media coverage. These results confirm that more 
neutral media coverage leads to higher market value and there appears to be no reverse 
causality from market value to media coverage. In addition, we do not find a causality 
relationship between negative media coverage and firm value. In summary, our main findings 
are largely robust to the potential endogeneity issue. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
C. The Moderating Effects of Ownership Structure and Audit Quality 
We further examine the moderating effects of firm ownership structure and external 
audit quality on the relationship between media coverage and firm value. Bai et al. (2004) 
suggest that the monitoring by non-controlling shareholders can alleviate the agency conflicts 
between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders (the Type II agency 
problem). Similar to Bai et al. (2004), we use the sum of the percentage of shareholding by 
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the second to the fifth largest shareholders as a proxy for non-controlling shareholder 
monitoring. Non-controlling shareholders with higher stake in a firm will have stronger 
incentive to monitor the controlling shareholder. Hence the Type II agency problem is less 
severe, and the monitoring role of the media is less pronounced for firms with higher 
non-controlling shareholder ownership. The Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 7 suggest that the 
positive relationship between non-negative media coverage and firm value only holds for 
firms with lower non-controlling shareholder ownership, consistent with our prediction. Fan 
and Wong (2005) suggest that larger audit firms can alleviate the Type II agency problem. 
Therefore we anticipate that the monitoring role of the media should be more pronounced for 
firms audited by smaller audit firms. The Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 7 again support our 
prediction by documenting that the relationship between media coverage and firm value only 
holds for firms hiring non-Big-10 audit firms. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
There is a belief that the Chinese media is highly controlled by the Chinese 
government. However, much anecdotal evidence suggests that it may play an important role 
in the corporate governance of listed firms in China. We investigate how media coverage of 
controlling shareholders affects firms’ valuation by investors. We find that firms whose 
controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports are valued higher by investors, 
while negative media reports about controlling shareholders will adversely affect firm value. 
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Further analyses reveal that the impacts of the media on firm valuation only hold for firms 
with lower ownership by non-controlling shareholders and audited by small audit firms. 
Our study has policy implications for China and other emerging countries. The 
Chinese government has been struggling with the privatization of old, state-owned enterprises. 
One of the biggest challenges is how to build more effective corporate governance systems to 
increase a firm’s efficiency. In addition, the Chinese government attempts to protect public 
minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Our results suggest 
that media coverage can play a very important monitoring role by shaping a controlling 
shareholder’s reputation and reducing information asymmetry. The negative relationship 
between negative media coverage and firm value also suggests that the media can discipline 
controlling shareholder misconduct by disseminating fraudulent and other self-serving 
activities and imposing significant influences over firm valuation. Therefore, the Chinese 
government should start to incentivize the media to be more active and increase their role as 
corporate monitors. 
The recent financial scandals by listed Chinese firms in the U.S. and other overseas 
capital markets also highlight the significant role of the media in detecting firm misconduct. 
For example, on March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in 
Canada and its shares were delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange on May 9, 2012. The 
company’s bankruptcy and delisting of shares were triggered by a negative research report by 
Muddy Waters Research, which alleged that Sino-Forest had been fraudulently inflating its 
assets and earnings. Our research provides more comprehensive evidence of this type of 
monitoring role by the media. 
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Interestingly, favorable media reports about a firm’s controlling shareholder are not 
associated with higher market valuation. This suggests that controlling shareholders could not 
enhance firm value by bribing the media to portray themselves positively. Investors would 
cast doubt on the integrity of journalists if they write favorable articles about a businessman. 
A better media strategy for family firms therefore is to truthfully represent their performance 
in order to gain trust from stakeholders and reduce information asymmetry between insiders 
and outside investors. 
Like most studies, ours is not without its limitations. First, the Chinese media is still 
highly controlled by the government. The level of control may vary between different levels 
of government such as the central government and local municipal governments. Thus it 
would be interesting to examine how the control by different levels of government affects the 
media’s monitoring role. Second, there is pervasive corruption by journalists (Li 2012) that 
might jeopardize the media’s monitoring role because more good news than bad news may be 
reported for selective companies. This is evidenced by the uncorrelated relationship between 
favorable media coverage and firm value in China. Third, the media is limited to domestic 
Chinese media and it is interesting to compare the monitoring roles of domestic media and 
international media. We anticipate more research will be done on the role of the media in 
corporate China. Finally, although we attempt to build a causal relationship between media 
coverage and firm valuation in the robustness tests, statistical analysis alone cannot constitute 
proof of a causal relationship. The findings from this study therefore should be interpreted 
with caution, and the managerial implications should not be stretched too far. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Variables  Definition  
Non-negative Media The logarithm of (1+ the number of favorable and neutral articles 
containing the name of a firm’s controlling shareholder) 
Positive Media The logarithm of (1+ the number of favorable articles containing the name of a firm’s controlling shareholder) 
Neutral Media The logarithm of (1+ the number of neutral articles containing the name of a firm’s controlling shareholder) 
Negative Media The logarithm of (1+ the number of unfavorable articles containing the name of a firm’s controlling shareholder) 
Tobin’s Q 
The sum of the market value of stockholders’ equity and the 
book value of liabilities, divided by the sum of the book value of 
equity and liabilities 
Control The percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
BM The ratio of book to market value of equity 
ROA Return on total assets 
Lev The ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Positive Media 0.25 0 0.77 0 8 
Neutral Media 1.19 0 6.63 0 176 
Negative Media 0.43 0 5.24 0 111 
Tobin’s Q 1.86 1.47 1.23 0.74 9.58 
Control(%) 31.57 28.76 12.78 9.31 75.82 
Ln(Assets) 20.75 20.74 0.82 18.82 23.19 
BM 0.47 0.48 0.37 -0.66 1.90 
ROA -0.03 0.02 0.25 -1.80 0.25 
Lev 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.00 2.43 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
 
 Tobin’s Q Non-negative Media 
Negative 
Media Control Size  BM Lev 
Non-negative Media -0.1058 1      
Negative Media 0.0628 0.0582 1     
Control -0.0849 0.1029 -0.0442 1    
Size  -0.4492 0.2593 0.0402 0.1222 1   
BM -0.6919 0.1466 -0.2038 0.0884 0.4647 1  
Lev 0.4668 -0.0832 0.1541 -0.0953 -0.0742 -0.4587 1 
ROA -0.4673 0.1000 -0.3394 0.1008 0.1284 0.4793 -0.6419 
 
Note: The estimated coefficients in bold are significant at a level of 5% (two-tailed). 
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Table 4. Media Coverage and Firm Valuation 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 Dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
   
Non-negative Media 0.217***  
 (0.064)  
Positive Media  -0.180 
  (0.134) 
Neutral Media  0.312*** 
  (0.075) 
Negative Media -0.336*** -0.353*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) 
Control  -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Size  -0.433*** -0.436*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) 
BM -1.981*** -1.999*** 
 (0.164) (0.163) 
Lev -0.497** -0.504** 
 (0.199) (0.199) 
ROA -1.817*** -1.804*** 
 (0.243) (0.243) 
Constant 11.57*** 11.68*** 
 (1.309) (1.304) 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Controlled Controlled 
Observations 964 964 
R-squared 0.591 0.594 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
(two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Two-Stage Heckman Self-Selection Regression Results 
 
 
 First-stage regression Second-stage regression 
 Dependent variable:  
Media Dummy 
Dependent variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
   
Selling expense 1.098*  
 (0.562)  
Positive Media  -0.122 
  (0.137) 
Neutral Media  0.332*** 
  (0.085) 
Negative Media  -0.277** 
  (0.120) 
Control  0.000 -0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Size  0.509*** -0.373*** 
 (0.072) (0.065) 
BM -0.784*** -2.006*** 
 (0.182) (0.162) 
Lev -0.207 -0.547** 
 (0.255) (0.213) 
ROA 0.108 -1.728*** 
 (0.287) (0.249) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.108 
  (0.078) 
Constant -10.550*** 10.19*** 
 (1.468) (1.318) 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Controlled Controlled 
Observations 940 940 
R-squared or 
Pseudo R-squared 
0.188 0.595 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
(two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Granger Causality Tests 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 Dependent 
variable: 
Change in neutral 
media at year t+1 
Dependent 
variable: 
Change in negative 
media at year t+1 
Dependent 
variable: 
Change in Tobin’s 
Q at year t+1 
    
Change in Tobin’s 
Q at year t 
-0.026 -0.001 0.132* 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.077) 
Change in positive 
media at year t 
  -0.114 
   (0.145) 
Change in neutral 
media at year t 
-0.477***  0.164** 
 (0.036)  (0.080) 
Change in negative 
media at year t 
 -0.422*** -0.008 
  (0.054) (0.279) 
Change in Control 
at year t 
0.001 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Change in Size at 
year t 
-0.137 0.211*** -0.955 
 (0.116) (0.072) (0.252) 
Change in BM at 
year t 
-0.268** 0.208*** 0.067 
 (0.119) (0.075) (0.330) 
Change in Lev at 
year t 
0.118 -0.017 -2.102*** 
 (0.176) (0.108) (0.415) 
Change in ROA at 
year t 
0.119 -0.221*** -1.793*** 
 (0.113) (0.072) (0.321) 
Constant 0.359** 0.048 1.540*** 
 (0.176) (0.108) (0.481) 
Year and industry 
dummies 
Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Observations 557 557 583 
R-squared 0.446 0.213 0.408 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
(two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 7. The Moderating Effects of Ownership Structure and Audit Quality 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Sub-sample: 
Minority 
shareholder 
ownership> 
sample median 
Sub-sample: 
Minority 
shareholder 
ownership< 
sample median 
Sub-sample: 
Firms audited 
by Big-10 
auditors 
Sub-sample: 
Firms audited 
by non-Big-10 
auditors 
     
Non-negative 
Media 0.149 0.232*** 0.169 0.212*** 
 (0.096) (0.087) (0.119) (0.079) 
Negative 
Media -0.201 -0.542*** -0.204 -0.328*** 
 (0.163) (0.183) (0.419) (0.127) 
Control  -0.008 -0.004 -0.012* -0.007* 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Size  -0.496*** -0.314*** -0.388*** -0.463*** 
 (0.101) (0.083) (0.139) (0.076) 
BM -1.932*** -1.845*** -2.342*** -1.855*** 
 (0.267) (0.209) (0.405) (0.185) 
Lev -0.385 -0.673** 0.231 -0.510** 
 (0.288) (0.294) (0.779) (0.218) 
ROA -1.523*** -2.592*** -0.759 -1.955*** 
 (0.342) (0.360) (0.707) (0.268) 
Constant 12.544*** 8.987*** 9.395*** 12.150*** 
 (2.097) (1.652) (2.895) (1.548) 
Year and 
industry 
dummies 
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Observations 484 480 197 767 
R-squared 0.579 0.640 0.626 0.594 
Note: Minority shareholder ownership is the sum of the percentage of shareholding by 
the second to the fifth largest shareholders. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tailed), respectively. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
